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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume 23 APRIL, 1938 Number 3
THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE*
CHARLES E. CLARKt
"Although I agree," said Collins, M. R., in a leading English
case, "that a Court cannot conduct its business without a code
of procedure, I think that the relation of rules of practice to the
work of justice is intended to be that of a handmaid rather than
mistress, and the Court ought not to be so far bound and tied
by rules, which are after all only intended as general rules of
procedure, as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice in
the particular case."' Sentiments such as these, when expressed
as abstract propositions, will no doubt win the assent of all. Ap-
plied to concrete cases, however, there is danger that by a con-
servative bench and bar they may be more honored in the breach
than in the observance. The learned judge's homely simile might
be carried further. A handmaid, no matter how devoted, seems
never averse to becoming mistress of a household should oppor-
tunity offer. Just so do rules of procedure tend to assume a too
obtrusive place in the attentions of judges and lawyers-unless,
indeed, they are continually restricted to their proper and subor-
dinate role. Now, at a time when at last there has been brought
substantially to fruition in our national courts a significant re-
form, involving the due subordination of civil procedure to the
ends of substantive justice, through the adoption of the new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it may be appropriate to ex-
amine this continuing conflict between substance and form and
to consider how it has there been resolved.
* This article formed the basis of a lecture delivered by Dean Clark at
the Washington University School of Law. This lecture by Dean Clark was
the initial lecture of a series of addresses to be given annually at the School
of Law by outstanding legal scholars and jurists.
t Dean, School of Law, Yale University.
1. In re Coles [1907] 1 K. B. 1, 4.
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The new Federal Rules were adopted by the Supreme Court
of the United States on December 20, 1937, to apply to the pro-
cedure in the district courts of the United States in all suits of a
civil nature.2 The Court acted on report of its Advisory Com-
mittee of fourteen, which since 1935 had been engaged in the
task of draftsmanship and which had submitted two formal
drafts of rules for consideration by the bench and bar of the
country. The Court found its authority to adopt the rules, which,
among other things, unite the practice in law and equity and
supersede federal statutes inconsistent with'them, in an act of
Congress passed finally in 1934 under the leadership of the pres-
ent Attorney General after agitation for a quarter of a century
by the American Bar Association and many of the most dis-
tinguished lawyers of America2 The rules take effect on Sep-
tember 1, 1938, or three months after the adjournment of the
present Congress, whichever may be the later date.4 Although
the rules have been laid before Congress as the statute requires,
no affirmative action by the legislative body is called for. It is
indeed possible that the Congress may pass some new statute
overturning, restricting, or otherwise varying the effect of the
rules. In fact a bill to repeal the rules and to restore the present
system of attempted conformity to state practice has already
been given a hearing by the House Judiciary Committee.5 One
is doubtless rash to venture a prophecy as to legislative action.
2. Rule 1, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter cited as FRCP).
Certain special proceedings are excepted by Rule 81. For the rules as finally
adopted, see Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States, available from the office of the Advisory Committee in Washington;
also published as H. R. Doc. No. 460, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.; 58 S. Ct. No. 10,
Supplement to issue of March 15, 1938; 94 F. (2d) No. 2, Supplement to
issue of March 14, 1938; 82 L. ed. Advance Opinions No. 8, Supplement;
(1938) 5 U. S. Law Week No. 18, sec. 2. The Committee also published Pre-
liminary Draft of May, 1936, Report of April, 1937 (both containing notes
to the rules), and Final Report of November, 1937, and will shortly publish
a revised copy of the notes containing also a bibliography of all law review
articles on the rules.
3. (1934) 48 Stat. 1064, (1935) 28 U. S. C. A. secs. 723b, 723c. For the
history of the movement, see Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Pro-
cedure-I. The Background (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 387; Clark, Power of the
Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure (1936) 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 1303, and articles therein cited.
4. Rule 86, FRCP.
5. H. R. 8892, introduced by Mr. Ramsay of West Virginia. The Com-
mittee hearing, March 1-4, 1938, is to be published as a House Document.
See also speech by Congressman Ramsay in the House, March 11, 1938, 83
Cong. Rec. 4377-4381.
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But it would seem that we are justified in hoping that the long
labors involved in the agitation for and execution of this reform
will not be thus summarily cast aside by the necessary votes of
the two legislative houses and the approval of the President be-
fore the product has had the opportunity of undergoing any test
of practical experience.
Since I had the honor to serve as Reporter for the Advisory
Committee which presented the draft of rules accepted in sub-
stance and, except in a few instances, in complete detail by the
Court, it is not appropriate for me to attempt to state the sup-
posed effect of the various separate rules.6 Interpretation is now,
of course, for the courts. Nor am I immediately interested in
such a task, but prefer to discuss the general principles of plead-
ing and procedure in the light of the continual clash between
form and substance I have spoken of above and to use the new
reform only to illustrate my thesis. I ask the question, What con-
crete steps may be taken to keep procedure in its modest position
as handmaid? And in making my answer I make use of these
rules as a concrete realization of what theory and experience
tell us to attempt.
The necessity of procedure in the sense of regularized conduct
of litigation is obvious. Court trials, like other matters of human
conduct involving continually recurring processes, must be sys-
tematized. In no other way can a great volume of business be
done at all. In no other way can it be fairly done. If there are
no rules upon which suitors can depend or rely, they can be
trapped or misled, while the favored friends of the tribunal are
securing special treatment. Regular procedure is necessary to
secure equal treatment for all; it is necessary, too, for the quite
as important factor of the appearance of equal treatment for all.
Regular habits are necessary in all daily tasks. A household be-
comes indeed disorganized if its head overturns even the settled
round of daily meals. The process of adjudication requires such
settled habits the more that litigants may not be prejudiced by
deviation therefrom, and that impartiality in fact, and in ap-
6. The author has discussed the rules, at various stages of their develop-
ment, in The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 22 A. B. A.
J. 447; A Strildng Feature of the Proposed New Rules (1936) 22 A. B. A.
J. 787; The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase (1937)
23 A. B. A. J. 976. Discussions by others will appear in the bibliography re-
ferred to in note 1, supra. See also (1938) 62 A. B. A. Rep. 705-707.
19381
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pearance to the parties and the public, shall be maintained.
This dilemma which justice faces of a choice between regular-
ity of action and individualization of treatment of suitors has
been often remarked upon. Holdsworth, the great English legal
historian, aptly states it as follows
One of the most difficult and one of the most permanent
problems which a legal system must face is a combination of
a due regard for the claims of substantial justice with a
system of procedure rigid enough to be workable. It is easy
to favour one quality at the expense of the other, with the
result that either all system is lost, or there is so elaborate
and technical a system that the decision of cases turns al-
most entirely upon the working of its rules and only occa-
sionally and incidentally upon the merits of the cases them-
selves.7
As this quotation indicates, and as experience teaches us, habit
has a tendency to become our master. We become so accustomed
to doing things in a certain way that no other seems open, even
though it may be easier and simpler. There are notable examples
of the tendency of practice rules to crystallize and harden. The
most famous is that afforded by the history of the Court of
Chancery. Originally developed through the function of the
Chancellor, as direct representative of the king, to order the
doing of justice in cases where the ordinary processes of the law
proved inadequate, this simple process in time became so complex
and dilatory that it was a prime example of the law's delays.
Who, reading Dickens' famous account in Bleak House of the
weary course in chancery of Jarndyce v. Jc rndyce over many
years, would think that this was the court and this the system
of justice which had its origin as a way of redressing the in-
justices of the law?
The trend of procedural rules towards undue rigidity is often
at variance with a developing substantive law. New political and
economic forces are likely to force new relationships between
persons, and new governmental attempts to control such rela-
tionships, while the process of enforcement becomes ever slower
and more cumbersome. The antithesis between process and sub-
stance has been pointed out by Professor Hepburn, leading his-
torian of the movement for code reform of pleading during the
7. 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law (3d ed. 1923) 251.
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last century. He speaks of "the inveterate nature of the incon-
gruity between procedure and substantive law" and goes on to
say, "The former petrifies while the latter is in its budding
growth" and "the conservatism of the lawyer preserves the in-
congruity."8
No wonder that there has been pressure for a ministry of
justice, as Cardozo has eloquently urged, to see to it that the pro-
cesses do not lag too far behind the public needs.9 Already there
are signs of a changed attitude. The judicial councils as public
bodies, and various private organizations, such as the American
Bar Association and the American Judicature Society, are now
expressing that demand for procedural reform which the politi-
cal movements of the day show for social and economic reform.
Reform has, however, been hampered by the extreme rever-
ence for the judicial process in this country. The American doc-
trine of judicial supremacy seems to foster such an awe of the
courts as to hinder movements for procedural improvement by
making them seem unnecessary. It is popular to compare the
processes of court with that of other governmental agents, to the
disadvantage of the latter. We speak of governmental red tape
or of bureaucracy triumphant, without realizing both that courts
have it also and further that they, like all governmental boards,
ought to have it. Not red tape, i. e., orderly procedure, but too
much of it and of the wrong sort is to be criticized. My colleague,
Professor Thurman Arnold, has provided the illustration for this
point by one of his favorite bits of light irony which contains
more than a grain of truth. Discussing why courts are considered
to be so much more effective than boards, he refers to the litera-
ture and philosophy which has grown up to explain the assumed
fundamental difference between a government of laws exempli-
fied by court decisions in contested cases and a bureaucracy oper-
ating through administrative boards and tribunals. In the con-
ventional literature of explanation, the difference is something
like this:
8. Hepburn, The Development of Code Pleading (1897) 31, 37.
9. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, reprinted
in Cardozo, Essays in Law and Literature (1931). See also Sunderland,
The Machinery of Procedural Reform (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 293. The
Journal of the American Judicature Society reports regularly on all proce-
dural developments.
1938]
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Courts are bound by precedent, and bureaus are bound by
red tape. Of course courts are forced to follow precedent
even when it leads to absurd results because of their solemn
obligation not to do anything in the future very much differ-
ent from what they have done in the past. But bureaus in
allowing themselves to be bound by red tape do so out of
pure malice and lack of regard for the fundamentals of free-
dom, because they have taken no oath not to violate the rules
and analogies of the past. Therefore they are much worse
than courts because courts only act unreasonably when they
can't help it, and bureaus act unreasonably when it is in their
power to do differently.
And hence it appears
that bureaus, even though given absolute power to enforce
the decrees of other persons in the government, do not use
that judgment in enforcing them which is so characteristic
of courts. They do not, on the one hand, check the govern-
ment in its wilder flights of regulatory fancy, nor on the
other hand'are they able to carry out the decrees of the
government efficiently because they are too bound down by
that particularly silly form of rule and precedent known as
red tape. Courts, on the contrary, do not concern them-
selves with red tape, but only with procedure and substan-
tive law. Both may sometimes be antiquated, but that is
never the fault of the court, whereas the red tape is always
the fault of the bureau.
So by definition a court must be a body of judges whose decisions
are right or caused by the fault of some one else (usually the
legislature) or unfortunate but unavoidable accidents due to the
circumstances that no human system can be perfect, while a
bureau is a body which, if it happens to make a wrong decision,
has no one to blame but itself, and if it happens to make a right
decision, offers us no assurance that it will do so again. A com-
mission is half-way between a court and a bureau.10
Mr. Arnold's explanation of all this is that we have developed
an attitude of respect toward a court because we use it to sym-
bolize an ideal of impersonal justice, whereas a bureau has as
yet little symbolic function and is therefore entitled to no greater
respect than are the individuals composing it. Whether or not
this is good social anthropology, it is still important that both
be subjected alike to critical consideration as to how efficiently
10. Arnold, The Symbols of Government (1935) 199-206.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss3/1
THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE
and satisfactorily they are carrying out their more mundane and
immediate tasks of adjudication of matters before them. With-
out question the many points of similarity between the courts
and those administrative agencies we even now term quasi-judi-
cial will become more and more apparent as time goes on. Each
should share the benefits of experience with the other.
It is true, too, that in some quarters, of much importance
politically, there is a reaction against the judicial process which
is carrying more and more activities of government away from
the courts and into the hands of expert commissions. This re-
action goes to the extent of making the ordinary rules of court
procedure, notably the rules of evidence, taboo before such agen-
cies. This trend may well be a healthy development, just as was
the growth of equity in former days,11 if it is not carried to the
point of throwing the baby out with the bath. But let us not
make the mistake our forefathers made as to equity. They be-
lieved its process could be formless, until at length they found
that they were caught in technicalities more rigid than ever
found in law. Even now the administrative boards are in danger
not of being unlike, but of being too much like courts. A friend
of commercial arbitration-that "process whereby business men
substitute their own processes of adjustments for the slow legal
settlement of business disputes-has warned that in England,
where an arbitration act has been in existence for years, there
is danger that the process by its increasing complications may
prove to be slower than that of the courts themselves.1 2 Vigilant
care that the procedure remain simple and effective is the effec-
tive weapon against such a danger which is being employed by
the American Arbitration Society. But the danger exists and
must be guarded against. Already administrative tribunals are
falling behind in their activities. Thus, the counsel for the
Bureau of Internal Revenue has pointed out recently that the
procedure of the Board of Tax Appeals should be re-examined
and reformed, just as-and this, I think, is especially interesting
-has the federal practice by the new rules. 18
11. An historical analogy suggested by Mr. Justice Stone, The Common
Law in the United States (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 18, and reprinted in
The Future of the Common Law (1937) 137, 138.
12. See Sturges, Book Review (1926) 26 Col. L. Rev. 785, in which he
points out the technical trend under the English Arbitration Act of 1889.
13. Kent, Some Current Problems of Tax Administration (1937) 23 A. B.
A. J. 947, 949.
19381
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One teaching of all this experience should continually be em-
phasized. There is danger of nalvet6 as to both the uses and the
abuses, the need for and the limitations of, formal rules. All too
often judges and law professors alike condemn the technicalities
of the procedural methods and then turn about and for lack of
understanding achieve results more technical than any experi-
enced student of the history of procedure would think of even
suggesting. In the law schools the study of procedure in the past
has been pushed into a corner as dull, uninteresting, and unim-
portant, whereas it is most necessary for the understanding of
what has gone on in the past, not to speak of the social need of
knowing what effective law administration is. Again a brilliant
court may show a general impatience with procedural delays and
faults only to make some of the strangest of procedural rulings,
either without appreciating their significance and how far they
are departing from modern viewpoints or in an endeavor to rid
themselves of unattractive cases through an assumed procedural
fault.14 But such omissions come back to plague us mightily.
Knowledge as a means of emancipation from the shackles of
error is just as sound a policy for the law of practice and pro-
cedure as it is for other affairs of life. If we know what the
rules are or have been, we shall know how and when we may
free ourselves from such part of them as is really overtechnical.
Now perhaps the first thing which experience teaches us is
that our rules should be continually changed and improved. Cer-
tainty and stability in the rules of substantive law is desirable,
though there seems to be little even of that obtainable in the
swiftly moving currents of modern society. But in procedural
law, while there should be rules clear enough to be understood
and applied, yet these should be changed as soon as they are
found by experience to be hampering. Even good rules may be-
come a nuisance when lawyers discover how to use them as in-
struments of delay. The element of flexibility and adjustability
to newly developing needs is therefore important. That element
is being found in the grant of rule-making authority to the
courts, thus making the court and not the legislature responsible
for keeping the tools of justice bright.
14. See the preface to Clark, Code Pleading (1928), and also Clark,
The Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 1.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss3/1
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Until recent times the courts were laggards in reform. Pres-
sure for change came from the legislatures and from them alone.
The first modern system of practice, the forerunner of much of
the reforms which have since followed, was the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure drafted by Edward Livingston in 1805. From
it came much of the best of the New York Code of 1848, the work
of David Dudley Field and his associates, and the model of the
code reform of pleading which has been adopted in a majority of
American states, has been imitated in England and the English
Colonies, and has profoundly affected the procedure of all other
American states.15 As late as 1933, the great state of Illinois
adopted code pleading, with its characteristic feature of the
union of the law and equity practices, in its new Civil Practice
Act effective 1934.16 Code pleading, as its name implies, is reform
by code, or statute. But modern legislatures are concerned with
all sorts of matters other" than judicial procedure, and rarely take
action as to it unless it be to pass some limited and particularistic
measure at the behest of a politically potent attorney. It is now
apparent that if detailed practice reforms are to be left to legis-
lative initiative, they will not take place. And so has developed
the movement for the lodging of the power to make procedural
rules in the courts. It happens that some text writers and some
courts, by way of dictum, have suggested, as a conclusion from
the political and constitutional doctrine of the separation of
powers, that the courts, and the courts only, have power to regu-
late their procedure. But for one hundred and fifty years no such
claim was made, while the legislature was freely exercising
authority over court procedure, and it seems doubtful whether
it is now worth while to contend that that history is erroneous.
Generally the indicated step is an enabling statute delegating
such power to the courts, a delegation which the courts have con-
sistently upheld as justified.17
15. See Clark, Code Pleading (1928) ch. 1, and Hepburn, The Develop-
nent of Code Pleading, supra note 8.
16. See the Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated and Clark, The New
Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933) 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 209.
17. Of the extensive literature on the rule-making power, the following
may be cited: Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affect-
ing Procedure (1937) 22 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 459-509 (contain-
ing many references to articles and statutes at pp. 463-469); Hyde, From
Common Law Rules to Rules of Court (1937) 22 WASHINGTON U. LAw
QUARTERLY 187; Warner, The Role of Courts and Judicial Councils in Pro-
19381
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Arguments made for rule-making power in the courts empha-
size the quality of expertness. That is important, but perhaps
even more vital is the quality of flexibility and adjustability to
the needs which develop as experience shows. Even the courts,
left in their own inertia, are not likely to take affirmative action,
but they at least may be stimulated by professional associations,
judicial councils, and like bodies. 18 The courts, too, need not
themselves undertake the work of detailed draftsmanship, but
may appoint committees to assist them. Such committees may
in turn make use of expert assistance and may hold hearings or
submit drafts to the bench and bar and otherwise obtain the best
professional advice upon suggested changes. In other words, the
legislatures are not, the courts are, in a position to see that what-
ever is needed may be done expertly, continuously, and effectively
in refashioning the procedure which they apply.
Hence there is an increasing tendency to delegate such rule-
making authority to the courts. Perhaps the most complete and
effective exercise to date of such power in state tribunals is
found in Wisconsin, where the statute, like the federal act of
1934, goes properly to the extent of providing that rules adopted
by the courts shall have the effect of rendering inconsistent sta-
tutes ineffective. This statute has been expressly upheld in an
authoritative opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,19 and the
system has given satisfaction even to those who initially opposed
it.20 The important power to adopt rules superseding statutes
exists also in the statutes of at least eleven other states.21 There
cedural Reform (1937) 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 441; Tyler, The Origin of the
Rule Making Power and its Exercise by Legislatures (1936) 22 A. B. A. J.
772 (A. B. A. prize essay, 1936).
18. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113.
19. In re Constitutionality of Statute Empowering Supreme Court to
Promulgate Rules Regulating Pleading, Practice, and Procedure in Judicial
Proceedings (1931) 204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W. 717, involving Wis. Stat. (1935)
sec. 251.18.
20. Testimony of Judge Padway, General Counsel of the American Fed-
eration of Labor, before the House Judiciary Committee, supra note 5.
21. Colorado, 1 Stat. Ann. (1935) Code Civ. Proc. sec. 444; Delaware,
Rev. Code (1935) ch. 108, sec. 6; Florida, Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1936) see.
4682 (1); Indiana, Acts 1937, ch. 91, p. 459; Maryland, Const. 1867, art. 4,
see. 18, for equity; Code 1924 (Supp. 1935) art. 26, sec. 35, for law; New
Jersey, Comp. Stat., 2 Cum. Supp. secs. 163-308, p. 2820, for law; Laws
1915, ch. 116, sec. 11, p. 168, for equity; New Mexico, Laws 1933, ch. 84;
Pennsylvania, Laws 1937, Act No. 392, approved June 1, 1937; South
Dakota, Laws 1937, ch. 60, p. 77; Washington, 2 Rem. Rev. Stat. sec. 13-1
et seq.; West Virginia, Laws 1935, ch. 37, p. 169, Code Ann. (1937) sec.
5183.
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are, however, at the present time commissions or councils actively
engaged in the consideration of revision of civil procedure in
North Dakota, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Alabama, and perhaps
elsewhere. 22
The work in these various states should receive a great stimu-
lus from the work of the Supreme Court of the United States
in presenting the new federal rules. Dean Gavit of Indiana, sec-
retary of the judicial council of that state, reports a study of
these rules to consider the changes which their adoption as state
rules would effect, and a first article reporting that study has
already appeared.22 I am informed that in North Dakota a simi-
lar consideration of the federal rules is being had. Adoption of
the new rules in various states, with, of course, such changes as
may be necessary, is a development greatly to be desired. Uni-
formity in procedure will be a boon to all; and the growth of
habits and customs whereby there is an interchange of ideas as
to noteworthy advances in practice between the various state and
federal systems is eminently desirable. Perhaps we may cease
to remain independent and foreign sovereignties as in the past,
so far as law administration is concerned, and may at least tend
in the direction of being a united people.
The new federal reform is likely, therefore, to have an im-
portant effect, beyond the direct and immediate changes it makes
in federal practice, in setting the standard and tone of procedural
reform throughout the country generally. This is doubtless
heightened by the long and strenuous campaign and final dra-
matic climax which preceded the adoption of the act of 1934.
Although the American Bar Association had waged its battle
for the statute since 1912, though on one occasion news came
from Washington that the bill was passed and the faithful for-
gathered to witness its ceremonial signing by the President,
only to discover that it was another bill which had been enacted,
yet the senatorial opposition led by Senator Walsh of Montana
could not be overcome. At length in 1933 the Association dis-
banded its committee, and ceased its efforts, only to have the
present Attorney General, Mr. Cummings, taking office on the
22. Correspondence of the writer. And see also current number of the
Journal of the American Judicature Society.
23. Gavit, The New Federal Rules and Indiana Procedure (1938) 13 Ind.
L. J. 203.
19381
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death of the Attorney General designate, Senator Walsh, press
forward its enactment with such vigor that it became law the
next year without opposition and in fact after a final legislative
history of only two or three months' duration.24 Further, the
extensive participation of the bench and bar in the work makes
it notable. The Advisory Committee appointed by the Court
was engaged for two years and a half in the task of draftsman-
ship. The number of comments and critical suggestions, and
their detailed and intelligent character, which the drafts of rules
presented by the Advisory Committee received from individual
lawyers and judges and representative committees appointed by
the district courts and various bar associations show what an
amazing amount of professional time and effort went into the
undertaking. No finer example of collective effort of the profes-
sion for reform has been known.25 It shows the possibility of
effective procedural reform at its best. If, as the American Bar
Association has recommended, the Supreme Court, upon the tak-
ing effect of the rules, appoints a standing Advisory Committee
to assist it in considering such changes as experience may deter-
mine necessary, then the quality of flexibility seems definitely
assured.
What should be the general direction of civil procedural re-
form, once that step is decided upon? The practically universal
trend of reform has been in favor of less binding and strict rules
of form enforced upon the litigants and their counsel and with a
large measure of discretion accorded to the trial judge in direct-
ing the course of a particular lawsuit. Specifically this means
general as distinguished from special pleading and freedom to
join diverse claims and various parties in a single civil action.
The new federal rules exemplify this trend. Since, nevertheless,
some lawyers and judges still are opposed to it, claiming that
the pleadings should produce, and trials should be limited to,
clearly defined and narrow issues,2 it is desirable to consider its
background in history and experience.
24. See note 3, supra.
25. See Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules (1936)
22 A. B. A. J. 787, and also Clark, Supreme Court Adopts Rules for Civil
Procedure in Federal District Courts (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 97.
26. For an able statement of this point of view, see Fee, The Proposed
New Rules for Uniform Procedure in the Federal District Courts (1937)
16 Ore. L. Rev. 103. And compare the speech of Congressman Ramsay, 83
Cong. Rec. 4377-4381 (1938).
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Now there exists a considerable misunderstanding of just what
went on in common-law pleading, that system which existed in
England and America until it was supplanted during the last
century by the more or less formless procedure of the code re-
form. Lawyers still speak with longing of the logical precision
which the common-law system was supposed to provide and to
compel the parties to employ. Actually while special pleading
could be had in the old days, yet in such usual cases as claims
for debt or negligence a simple form of general allegation was
permissible, a practice so admirable that it was carried over to
the more successful of the code systems, and thence directly into
the new federal rules. As I shall point out later, some of the
basic illustrative forms of pleading issued by the Court as an
appendix to these new rules come directly from the common law.
Lawyers and judges in the old days might appear to worship
form and obey formal rules. Yet they had a penchant for getting
things done, and so they used the rules, with the aid now and
then of some convenient fiction or subterfuge, to accomplish re-
sults without unnecessary trouble.
That the older system is so generally regarded as inflexible and
restrictive seems due to the two causes that the historic forms
of action were actually restrictive and that the authorities con-
tinually stressed the issue-formulating objective of pleading.
As to the forms of action, and its corollary, the separation of
law and equity into different systems enforced in different courts,
these were the main occasions for the wave of pleading reform
in the nineteenth century. The forms had an historic significance
illustrating the triumph of the king's courts and of the central
power of the early Norman kings. A suitor desiring the king's
justice went to the king's clerks in chancery to procure a writ
or royal command of the king to his sheriff to summon a de-
fendant before the high courts. The clerks being typical lawyers
looked to their precedents before issuing a writ. Hence unless
one could make his claim conform to the recognized forms-tres-
pass, case, trover, detinue or covenant, debt, or assumpsit-one
had no remedy. And if one started with the wrong writ for his
case, one was just out of luck until and unless he procured a
new writ to start a new case along proper grounds. Just so the
separate law and equity systems developed, the latter as both a
supplement and a corrective of the former; but if one chanced
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to get into the wrong tribunal, there was nothing to be done
short of starting over again in the correct place.
When the historic reasons for division had for several cen-
turies ceased to have point, there seemed, as there was, no reason
for penalizing suitors for having come to the wrong court, or
having come to the right court in the wrong way. And so the
code reform caused the abolition of the forms of action, the union
of law and equity, and the use of the one form of action for all
civil causes. It is true a few states pride themselves on retain-
ing the division. I saw recently such a case in New Jersey where
the claim of the bar is that the separation makes for better and
abler lawyers.2 7 This was a case of suit brought in a court of
law by a partial assignee of a debt against the debtor. Had the
original creditor assigned all the claim to the plaintiff, it was
agreed that the case was properly brought; but since this creditor
retained a part interest in the claim, and since a partial assignee
can sue only in equity, the case was thrown out.28 Now that may
make for better lawyers, but one wonders what the litigants
think of that. Perhaps the only reply to that suggestion is the
exquisite bit of irony in Serjeant Hayes's famous dialogue, "Cro-
gate's Case," where Baron Surrebutter (transparent disguise for
the master technician Baron Parke) makes his classic reply to
the inquiry as to what the suitors may think of a legal techni-
cality which has caused them to lose their cases. "Mr. Crogate,"
said the distinguished justice, "that consideration has never oc-
curred to me, nor do I conceive that laws ought to be adapted
to suit the tastes and capacities of the ignorant."2
But that answer has not been found adequate in most juris-
dictions. And in the federal system, too, the new rules mark
the latest triumph of the one form of civil action. It is true that
under the Conformity Act of 1872 practice at law in the federal
27. Honorable Merritt Lane, Chancery Practice, N. J. St. Bar Ass'n Q.,(1937) 210; Stevenson, V. C., in L. Martin Co. v. L. Martin & Wilckes Co.(1908) 75 N. J. Eq. 39, 71 Atl. 409; Justice V. A. Griffith, Should the Court
of Chancery Remain Separate (1930) 2 Miss. L. J. 369, 380; cf. Kenyon,
L. J., in Bauman v. Radenius (1798) 7 Durnford & E. 663, 667 ("the most
perfect system").
28. Glaser v. Columbia Laboratories (1933) 11 N. J. Misc. 707, 167 Atl.
201; see also Young v. Weber (1934) 117 N. J. Eq. 242, 175 Atl. 273; San
Giacomo v. Oration Inv. Co. (1928) 103 N. J. Eq. 273, 143 At. 329.
29. Hayes, Crogate's Case; A Dialogue in the Shades on Special Pleading
Reform, quoted by Sir Frederick Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law
(1912) ch. III, Surrebutter Castle.
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district courts was supposed to conform to the local practice of
the state within which the court was held; and hence to the ex-
tent which the conformity principle permitted, the adoption of
the one civil action in a state would operate also in the federal
court of that district. But in the federal tribunals law and equity
were (and still are, until next fall at least) separate systems,
even though administered by the same judge. This separation
was all the more annoying because by the equity rules of 1912
and the Law and Equity Act of 1915 provision had been made
for transfer back and forth from one calendar to another, and
for the filing of equitable defenses in legal actions and the con-
verse. One had to watch out that one was on the proper side of
the court, though one could change around as needed. In other
words whatever of substance there was had already gone; only
the vestiges remained to trouble by the question whether they
did actually mean anything and if so what.30 These, and the
luckless conformity principle, to which I shall make reference
later, will be wiped out by the new reform.
Even when these divisions are formally abolished the experi-
ence of the state courts is to demonstrate the reluctance of even
great judges to let the past go. "The inherent and fundamental
difference between actions at law and suits in equity cannot be
ignored," dogmatizes one distinguished tribunal. And so it sug-
gested that an action be dismissed, in order to be begun over
again in the same court and in the same way.31 One would not
realize from the court's way of speaking that what it really had
in mind was the protection of the historic trial by jury, consti-
tutionally a right of litigants in law, but not in equity, cases.
To see to it that the case is tried properly, the court seemed to
think that it must throw out all the preliminary steps from the
institution of suit down through the pleadings and force the liti-
gants to start over, if indeed the defendant had stayed around
where he could be caught again, or had retained his assets suffi-
cient to satisfy a judgment. Yet that is clearly unnecessary. The
right to jury trial does not prevent the single civil action or sim-
plified pleading. Provision for proper and clear claim of jury
30. Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Procedure (1935) 20 Corn.
L. Q. 443; Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The Back-
ground (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 387.
31. Jackson v. Strong (1917) 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512. See Clark,
The Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 1.
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trial when trial approaches, coupled with a rule of definite waiver
(since the parties can have the more expeditious trial to the court
if both prefer it), such waiver to be shown by failure to make
jury claim within a stated period, will solve this difficulty. Such
is the proposed plan under the federal rules, copied from effec-
tive state practice.82
The formulary system of the common law did operate to cut
down the kinds of claims wlbich could be presented in a single
action. This was because claims could be joined only if within
the same form of action. Several trespasses could be joined; so
could several debts, even when they arose purely by operation
of law. But no crossing of the line of division of the forms of
action was permissible. In equity, on the other hand, the test
was otherwise, based upon the transaction or factual situation
out of which the claims arose-all claims thus arising out of one
affair being joinable. With the one action, these restrictions were
blotted out. The early code makers, David Dudley Field and his
associates, feared to permit quite free joinder, as we have seen
to be desirable. Why should not people be encouraged to bring
all their opposing claims out in the open to be settled at one time,
so that they can thereafter go about their business without fear
of further and reprisal lawsuits? Why, too, should not all parties
interested in fundamentally similar claims join to adjudicate
them? But this was too great a step and the Field Code provided
for the joining of parties only by certain rules of formal limita-
tion (interest in the subject of the action and in the relief to be
granted) which even yet are not understood.83 And the joining
of claims was limited by a scheme of stating usually seven or
eight classes of what were termed causes of actions and allowing
joinder only within a class.34 Here was a new term, came of
action, quite undefined (apparently on the principle that every-
body knew what it was) and destined to a long, inglorious, and
destructive career. In the hands of some courts and some text-
writers and restrictively defined, it has done more damage than
ever the forms of action could possibly do. And there has been
32. Rules 38, 39 FRCP. And see citations in the Committee's notes to
these rules; James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure
(1936) 45 Yale L. J. 1022; Clark, Trial of Actions Under the Code (1926)
11 Corn. L. Q. 482.
33. Clark, Code Pleading (1928) ch. 6.
34. Id., ch. 7.
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no agreement as to its meaning, so that there was any certainty
what courts would do next in applying it not only to joinder of
causes, but in other situations, such as stating the cause, amend-
ing it after the statute of limitations had run, or splitting it into
two or more lawsuits. I consider myself a battle-scarred veteran
of this rather futile, or at least unnecessary, war. In a rash
moment, in the days of my youth, I perpetrated an article de-
fining the "cause" and attempting to read some pragmatic sig-
nificance into it by considering the purposes it might have been
intended to subserve. Substantially I considered it to be the old
equity concept of the factual situation giving ground or cause
for multiple possible claims, or rights of action, and that it should
not be given the restrictive significance of a single right of
action.3 5 I thought, and still think, that, notwithstanding the
clamor and confusion of tongues, I had history and logic as well
as practical convenience with me; and several courts of some
renown seemed to agree with me, for they quoted the definition
approvingly.8 To my surprise, however, many of my colleagues,
the professors, went off the deep end, and a lot of law review
articles blossomed forth and have been blooming ever since.3 7 To
say that I had desecrated the ark of the covenant-of special
form in pleading-is to put it mildly.
I have been interested to note that recently a formidable hunts-
man has come hot on my trail in the shape of your fellow towns-
man and my good friend, Professor Carl Wheaton.38 Professor
Wheaton pays me the subtle compliment of suggesting that I
have succeeded in misleading some very distinguished judges and
35. Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 817; Clark,
The Cause of Action (1934) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 354.
36. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co. (1933) 288 U. S. 62, 53
S. Ct. 278, 77 L. ed. 619; Harris v. Tams & King (1932) 258 N. Y. 229, 179
N. E. 476; Stafford Sec. Co., Inc. v. Kremer (1931) 258 N. Y. 1, 179 N. E.
32; Covey v. England & McCaffrey, Inc. (1931) 233 App. Div. 332, 253
N. Y. S. 340; Whalen v. Strong (1930) 230 App. Div. 617, 246 N. Y. S. 40;
cf. Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. United States (1933) 289 U. S. 28, 53 S. Ct. 454,
77 L. ed. 1011.
37. Most of the articles are cited in Clark, The Cause of Action (1934)
82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 354. A typical selection would be McCaskill, Actions
and Causes of Action (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 614; Gavit, A "Pragmatic Defi-
nition" of the "Cause of Action"? (1933) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 129; McCas-
kill, The Elusive Cause of Action (1937) 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 281; Wheaton,
The Code "Cause of Action": Its Definition (1936) 22 Corn. L. Q. 1.
38. Wheaton, The Code "Cause of Action": Its Definition (1936) 22
Corn. L. Q. 1; see also Wheaton, Causes of Action Blended (1938) 22 Minn.
L. Rev. 498.
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then says that he should like to follow me, only the limitations
imposed by a due respect for mental honesty prevent. Certainly
I do not feel I ought to put such a strain on any one. And so I
recommended to the Advisory Committee, and the Committee
agreed, that we forget this phrase totally and completely, as it
had outlived its usefulness, if it ever had any. Several of our
learned colleagues always felt lost without it, but I think most
of us feel it is good riddance. At any rate the rules provide, in
accordance with the trend in the newer procedure in the states
and the English model, that joinder of claims shall be quite free,
and joinder of parties had on the basis of the existence of a com-
mon question of law or fact arising out of a single transaction
or series of transactions. Any possible injustice is obviated by
the power in the court to order separate trials of any issues.0
Now the other feature of the common-law system, the formu-
lating of issues, need not cause trouble if the requirement is not
of too narrow issues. Ancient pleading did stress the theory that
the parties by their successive written pleadings admitting and
avoiding or denying the assertions of their opponents should
ultimately isolate the one point in dispute between them and leave
that alone for the formality of trial, all other extraneous matter
being thus removed.40 This might occasionally happen in the com-
paratively simple case. But many times it would not, for the
simple reasons, either that there were actually more matters in
dispute, or that counsel could not afford to admit that there were
not more. The latter is most important. In advance of trial it
is not to be expected that the attorneys will put themselves in a
position of showing more of their case than they have to, or
where they cannot take advantage of whatever favorable evi-
dence may later develop. Actually special pleading is a game
where you try to catch the other fellow in an admission caused
by his saying too much while you say as little as you can. It is
obvious, since words can be used to conceal as well as to betray
information, that wise lawyers are not so caught. As to the
unwise lawyers, an admission may really be a betrayal of an
innocent client, and courts are properly unwilling to penalize
clients for the mistakes of their lawyers. Consequently amend-
39. See particularly Rules 18-21, 24, 42, 13 and 14, and the Committee's
notes to them.
40. Clark, Code Pleading (1928) pp. 10, 11, 29, 30, 150, 479, 480.
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ments are permitted and the whole idea of the single isolated
issue is gone. Experience should teach us not to fight this ten-
dency of the lawyer to protect his client-indeed we teachers
could not consider him well trained unless we teach him this-
but to develop our rules on the basis of it. No case is won by
admissions in the pleadings unless the lawyer is willing or dumb.
He is willing only when there is only an issue of law anyhow,
and an agreed statement to present such an issue is easily ob-
tained. Special pleading, in other words, just does not work. It
never has; it cannot be expected to in the future.41
Now at common law the harshness of the formal statement
of the issue-formulating process was avoided in several ways,
such as the use of several counts or defenses to present either
the same matter or different matters, but in different compart-
ments of the pleading. That was permitted at common law; it
is permitted today. But it leads to wordy and repetitious state-
ment. A more adequate method which was anciently used was
the broadening of the issue, i. e., general pleading. Consider the
common counts in assumpsit. These allowed a very broad and
general statement of a debt due. With the defendant's plea of
the general issue ("non-assumpsit"-he did not promise) the is-
sue was made. Consider Forms 4 to 8 set forth in the new federal
rules. They are modern direct statements based on these common
law models, which, although criticized from time to time by
theorists, were found practically too convenient to be rejected in
code pleading. Thus, Form 5 is the common-law complaint for
goods sold and delivered, "Defendant owed plaintiff ten thousand
dollars for goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant be-
tween June 1, 1936, and December 1, 1936." And Form 6 is
money lent, "Defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars for
money lent by plaintiff to defendant on June 1, 1936," while
Form 8 is money had and received, "Defendant owes plaintiff ten
thousand dollars for money had and received from one G. H.
on June 1, 1936, to be paid by defendant to plaintiff."142 .
41. The author has discussed this matter elsewhere. See Clark, Pleading
Negligence (1923) 32 Yale L. J. 483; the discussion with Chief Justice
Maltbie appearing in (1935) 9 Conn. Bar J. 282-297; and Clark, The New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 976.
42. For discussion of the function of this count, see Mr. Justice Stone in
Stone v. White (1937) 301 U. S. 532, 57 S. Ct. 851, 81 L. ed. 1265. See also
Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 196-202; Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of
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These forms which I have referred to may prove to be about
the most important feature of the new rules. They afford the
illustrations to show what the words in the rules proper mean,
to show as Rule 84 states, "the simplicity and brevity of state-
ment which the rules contemplate." The success of several of the
best state practice codes is held to depend on the fact that they
were accompanied by illustrative forms.43 With these as exam-
ples no pleader should feel compelled to long and involved asser-
tions. Not that such allegations, where necessary to present a
complicated case, are forbidden. The rules definitely permit a
considerable choice to the pleader as to how he shall tell his story.
Thus prohibitions developed in certain codes against alternative
or conditional statements are expressly removed.4" If he is not
sure of his facts he may show what his doubt is so long as he
honestly sets forth what he knows. But the model is the simple,
direct, and rather general statement familiar to generations of
lawyers by its use from common-law times to the present.
The advantage of such a flexible system seems obvious. Are
there disadvantages? Does this permit a party unfairly to con-
ceal his case? I think it can be shown that it does not. Of course
we must decide what we expect of the pleadings, the formal writ-
ten statements of the parties in advance of trial. If it is proof
of the other fellow's case, that is a vain hope, as I have tried
to show. I verily believe, however, that the supporters of detailed
pleading still hope to dispense with proof in this way. What we
can expect, however, is such a statement of the case as will iso-
late it from all others, so that the parties and the court will
know what is the matter in dispute, the case can be routed
through the court processes to the proper method of trial and
disposition, and the judgment will be res atjudicat, so that the
same matter cannot again be litigated. There is no fixed and
Fact" (1937) 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 233; Ilsen, The Preliminary Draft of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1937) 11 St. John's L. Rev. 212. Com-
pare Mr. Chief Justice Hughes's approval of simplified form of statement
in patent litigation: Mumm v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons (1937) 301 U. S.
168, 57 S. Ct. 675, 81 L. ed. 983.
43. Rossman, Approved Forms of Pleading (1932) 12 Ore. L. Rev. 3;
Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes (1921) 21 Col. L.
Rev. 416; Sunderland, The Michigan Judicature Act of 1915 (1917) 14
Mich L. Rev. 551. And see also (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 1483 and references to
the Connecticut Bar Journal, note 41, supra.
44. Rule 8(e). This was criticized by Congressman Ramsay at the hear-
ing, and also in his address, both supra note 5.
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certain rule as to the detail required. It is more or less of a
compromise determined by the habits and traditions of the law-
yers and the needs and exigencies of each of the parties in intelli-
gently fighting the particular case through. Let us turn to one
of the most usual situations now litigated, the automobile acci-
dent case, to see how the matter of pleading actually works out.
Form No. 9 of the new rules deals with this matter. The vital
allegation is, "On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boyls-
ton Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove
a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said high-
way." Then follows a brief description of the plaintiff's injury.
This form is taken directly from the Massachusetts statute.45 In
turn it comes from Chitty and the common-law action of trespass
on the case.46 It has stood the test. It shows the one kind of
case the plaintiff is relying on-an automobile accident case
where the autoist is claimed to have run a pedestrian down.
What more could one properly ask?
Now some lawyers have thought that further details should
be added. But details will not necessarily paint a truer picture.
They may even mislead. I recall one shrewd and successful negli-
gence lawyer who always added to every case three pages of
detailed facts of negligence copied from a standard form he had
devised. Of course many, even on their face, would have no
relevancy to the matter in dispute. But they would do no harm,
since the inappropriate would be automatically eliminated at the
trial without penalty to the pleader. And in any event he and
his client were protected against any developments. So with our
form, what can be added with profit? Defective brakes, lack of
headlights, failure to keep a lookout, etc.? It would be nice, in-
deed, for the plaintiff if the defendant would admit any of these
things. And yet it is the plaintiff who is making the allegations.
Moreover none of them are primary or ultimate in the sense that
even if they existed the case would be proven. After all in an
accident case such as this, the question really is one of timing
of the two bodies in collision with reference to each other and
the ultimate essential points of testimony are, therefore, the rela-
tive speed of each actor and the course on the street each traveled
45. 2 Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) ch. 231, sec. 147, Form 13.
46. 2 Chitty, Pleading (7th ed. 1844) 529; Williams v. Holland (C. P.
1833) 10 Bing. 112.
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up to the point of impact. The succinct statement of the old
form brings out the plaintiff's essential claim as clearly as a
wealth of details would. Except for the possibility of entrapment
of an opponent by inducing him to admit what he does not wish
to-and that is as unlikely as it should be undesirable-the com-
plaint serves every reasonable purpose, without forcing the plain-
tiff unduly to prejudice his case.47
Attempted use of the pleadings as proof is now less necessary
than ever with the development of two devices to supply such
elements of proof as may be necessary before trial. These are
discovery and summary judgment, both the subject of extensive
provisions in the new rules.48 By means of discovery-proceed-
ings for the examination of witnesses or opposing parties before
trial-a party may learn whatever he needs to know about his
case or his opponent's case before trial. Formerly this was
thought undesirable, for counsel was entitled to have something
in reserve with which to surprise his opponent at the last min-
ute of trial. Now it is felt fairer, and more productive of truth
in ultimate analysis, to require disclosure of all of a claim or
defense at an early stage of the proceedings. The possibility of
the manufacture of rebuttal testimony, which cannot be detected,
seems less objectionable than concealment and surprise and is
offset by the desirability of putting the observers on record at an
early stage and to that extent preventing the concoction of false
evidence. Summary judgment, unlike the pleadings proper, does
call for a searching examination of the opposing party with the
penalty that he will lose his case if he does not respond. It can
therefore accomplish what pleadings cannot. By it the party
moving for judgment summarily supports his own case by de-
tailed affidavits of fact and thus forces his opponent to reply in
like detail. It should be noted, however, that it is adapted only
for rather simple issues where the facts are on the surface. The
motion will be denied when a disputed question of fact is dis-
closed. When this happens resort to the procedure has only de-
layed the case. But since it is usually the plaintiff who is press-
ing the case to summary judgment, he is likely to refrain from
asking for this remedy if the chances are that he will have only
47. See discussion in 9 Conn. Bar J. 282 et seq.; cf. Mezzi v. Taylor
(1923) 99 Conn. 1, 120 At. 871.
48. Rules 26-37 and 56, and the Committee's notes thereto.
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delay to show for his pains. Nevertheless the remedy, while im-
portant for the disposal of cases where the opponent has no real
defense on the facts, is very far from universal in its applica-
bility. In fact in the case of a real dispute, there is no substitute
anywhere for a trial. To attempt to make the pleadings serve
as such substitute is in very truth to make technical forms the
mistress and not the handmaid of justice.
I have spoken thus at some length of the general philosophy
of modern pleading, because knowledge of that is important in
order to understand present-day reforms. And the way in which
that philosophy is embodied in the new federal rules seems to
me one of the important and interesting features of that reform,
particularly to students and teachers. Let me reiterate that I am
attempting no complete summary of the rules. The activities of
law publishers announcing many books, one of three-volume
size, indicate that no brief paper can adequately describe them.
Some features, such as the discovery and summary judgment pro-
visions, I have mentioned in passing; others, such as those broad-
ening the rules of admissible evidence and simplifying the taking
of appeals and the preparation of appellate records, deserve more
than the bare reference with which I must leave them. As I
close, I would like, however, to stress the approach to uniformity
in the procedural law of this country which the rules should stim-
ulate. Senator Walsh in so long opposing the new reform ob-
jected that a complicated metropolitan practice was to be forced
upon the lawyers of various remote states in place of the simple
practice they knew. If that result was likely, his opposition was
justified. I do not believe in retrospect that it can now be said
to have followed; for the practice recommended is the simplest
and most flexible known in this country. And it supplants one
in the highest degree complex and involved. Lawyers still speak
of the principle of the old conformity act of 1872 as allowing
local lawyers to go into the federal courts secure in the knowledge
that their state procedure will be followed.4 9 But the actual situ-
tion is far otherwise. Federal practice is now the most esoteric,
the most highly specialized of procedural systems. One needs
unusual preparation to venture into it. The conformity principle,
49. Compare discussion at the hearing; also Congressman Ramsay's
speech, both supra note 5.
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by definition and decision, does not apply to matters of jurisdic-
tion and constitutional right, and hence it governs only to a
limited extent the institution of suit, and not at all matters of
trial and appeal; it does not apply in equity or to matters where
equity and law are already partially blended, as in the case of
equitable defenses; it is set aside by special acts of Congress, a
broadening field as Congress acts more and more to reform at
least parts of practice, such, for example, as amendment of plead-
ings and process. In fact it is difficult to know when it begins
and where it ends.50 Yet its existence makes impossible a definite
body of general procedural precedents. What it does is to force
a special federal practice in each state, which is unique for that
territorial area, and is neither the local nor the ancient chancery,
nor the federal statutory and constitutional, procedural, but is a
mixture of all.
It is for that complex and complicated structure that a single
uniform system of simple uncomplicated allegation, and answer,
of production of proof and trial and appeal, is to be substituted.
If it happens thereafter that the states go on to adopt this proce-
dure as their own, then Senator Walsh's fears may prove indeed
to have been groundless. For instead of pressing a strange prac-
tice on those accustomed to a simplified one, the simplified sys-
tem not only will operate throughout the entire establishment of
national courts, but may well serve to exorcise a complex proce-
dure from the state courts as well.
50. Cf. Tolman, The Origin of the Conformity Ideas, Its Development,
the Failure of the Experiment (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 971, and Clark and
Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The Background (1935) 44 Yale
L. J. 387.
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